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The collapse of the construction industry during the 1930s resulted in a housing
crisis of unprecedented proportions in cities throughout Canada. Winnipeg faced
a particularly difficult situation. Beginning in 1934, the city undertook several
endeavours to remedy the problem, all of which failed. While the shortcomings of
federal housing programmes and reluctant federal and provincial governments
were partly to blame for the failure of these local efforts, municipal debates on
the subject of housing reveal that reform was also stalled by opposition from the
local business elite, whose members disliked competition in the rental market.
L’effondrement de l’industrie de la construction dans les anne´es 1930 a provoque´
une crise sans pre´ce´dent du logement dans les villes du Canada. La situation e´tait
particulie`rement difficile a` Winnipeg. En 1934, la ville a commence´ a` prendre des
mesures pour corriger le proble`me : toutes ont e´choue´. Si les faiblesses des pro-
grammes fe´de´raux de logement et la re´ticence des gouvernements fe´de´ral et provin-
cial ont contribue´ partiellement a` l’e´chec de ces efforts locaux, les de´bats
municipaux sur la question du logement re´ve`lent que la re´forme s’est e´galement
heurte´e a` l’opposition de l’e´lite locale du milieu des affaires, dont les membres
n’aimaient pas la concurrence sur le marche´ locatif.
DURING THE 1930s, Canadian cities struggled to cope with a significant
housing shortage. Between 1931 and 1933, the Dominion Bureau of
Statistics reported that, while population growth necessitated the construc-
tion of 27,500 dwelling units, only 2,609 had been built.1 By the end of
the decade, nearly one-third of municipalities recorded a vacancy rate
of zero, while two-thirds of municipalities had vacancy rates below
* Stefan Epp is currently a research associate at the University of Manitoba and holds an MA in history
from Queen’s University.
1 Legislative Library of Manitoba, House of Commons Special Committee on Housing, “Minutes of
and Proceedings and Evidence No. 11, Third and Final Report,” April 11, 1935 – April 15,
1935, p. 374.
1 per cent.2 Consequently, people across the country were forced to live in over-
crowded and unsanitary dwellings. The city of Winnipeg was a case in point.
In analysing housing policy during the 1930s, this study focuses on the
policies of two levels of government: federal and municipal. While the
federal government did adopt several house construction programmes in
the mid-to-late 1930s, these were unsuccessful in addressing housing
shortages in Winnipeg and, indeed, in many parts of the country, particu-
larly in the West. Federal programmes generally failed to meet Winnipeg’s
housing needs. Furthermore, although there was frequent advocacy for
public housing at the municipal level in Winnipeg, it did not result in
any construction due to opposition from the local business community
and other levels of government. The provincial government, for
example, had little to say on housing in the city, perhaps because of the
legislature’s largely rural composition, except occasionally to veto munici-
pal decisions. Despite the dogged attempts of some local politicians to
introduce housing reforms, inadequate federal programmes and local
opposition from property owners combined to inhibit any social housing
developments in Winnipeg during the 1930s.
Jill Wade, Richard Harris, and David Hulchanski have begun to engage
seriously the early history of Canadian housing.3 However, relatively little
scholarship addresses housing policy prior to the Second World War. Yet
the post-war building boom and the government policies that supported it
did not develop in a historical vacuum. Winnipeg’s engagement with
federal housing programmes illustrates the roots of Canadian housing
policy and of the welfare state. This “pre-history” of the Canadian
welfare state serves as a reminder that the development of social pro-
grammes was intensely resisted by numerous political and economic
elites and interest groups.
Municipal Politics in Winnipeg
The legacy of the General Strike of 1919 has given Winnipeg a prominent
place in the memory of Canadian labour history, and it gave Winnipeg’s
municipal politics a unique character for decades after the strike. As Ed
Rea and Brian McKillop have demonstrated, the class divisions that seg-
mented Winnipeg during the strike continued to dominate municipal
2 John C. Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace: The Evolution of Canadian Housing Policy (Montreal
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), p. 122.
3 Jill Wade, Houses for All: The Struggle for Social Housing in Vancouver, 1919–1950 (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 1994); David Hulchanski, “The 1935 Dominion Housing Act:
Setting the Stage for a Permanent Federal Presence in Canada’s Housing Sector,” Urban History
Review, vol. 15 (June 1986), pp. 19–39; Richard Harris, “Working-class Home Ownership and
Housing Affordability Across Canada in 1931,” Histoire sociale – Social History, vol. 19, no. 37
(May 1986), pp. 121–138, and Creeping Conformity: How Canada Became Suburban, 1900–1960
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
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politics throughout the 1920s and 1930s.4 The city remained sharply
divided by the overlapping categories of ethnicity, language, geography,
occupation, and class. Winnipeggers themselves recognized the class
dichotomy within their city, describing municipal politics as a “battle-
ground” between established institutions and the political Left.5
Appreciating this division is essential for understanding the debates over
efforts towards housing reform in the city, as all political activity was con-
tested within the broader struggle between “Citizens” and “Socialists.”
The Civic Election Committee (CEC) represented the pro-business
interests in Winnipeg.6 Often known as the “Citizens” since the committee
was the political descendent of the Citizens’ Committee of One Thousand
during the General Strike, the CEC consisted of Liberals and
Conservatives who cooperated for the purposes of municipal elections,
largely to ensure that labour candidates were defeated and that business
interests were protected.7 The most important thing a municipal govern-
ment could do, according to the Citizens, was to run a business-like,
efficient administration that kept both taxes and costs low. An advertisement
in 1933 proclaimed that CEC candidates stood for “sound government,”
“economical methods,” “meeting obligations,” and “impartial judgement.”8
Consequently, many Citizen aldermen denounced the expenditure of
money on housing programmes because these were deemed to be both
socialist and an unnecessary burden on taxpayers.
The Independent Labour Party (ILP) was the largest labour party in the
city. The ILP manifesto often included statements such as “the social own-
ership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange is essential
to the permanent solution of problems arising out of social and economic
ills.”9 Yet, rather than revolution, ILP candidates suggested that society
should be reformed along the basis of “humanity first, not property.”10
ILP election platforms emphasized efforts to ameliorate the worst con-
ditions in the city: improving unemployment relief and working conditions,
developing a city housing programme to relieve slum districts, instituting
public ownership of transportation and other services, and shifting the
4 Ed Rea, Parties and Power: An Analysis of Winnipeg City Council, 1919–1975 (Winnipeg:
Department of Urban Affairs, Province of Manitoba, 1976), p. 1; Brian McKillop, “The Socialist
as Citizen: John Queen and the Mayoralty of Winnipeg, 1935,” MHS Transactions Series, vol. 3,
no. 30 (1973–1974), available online http//:www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/transactions/3/queen1935.shtml.
5 General R. Y. Patterson quoted in “Webb Supporters Name Workers in Mayoralty Fight,” Winnipeg
Free Press, November 10, 1933.
6 Throughout the article, the terms Citizens and CEC are used interchangeably and have the same
meaning.
7 University of Manitoba Archives [hereafter UMA], Ed Rea Collection, MSS 73, box 1, file 1, Stanley
Knowles, interview with Brian McKillop, June 14, 1969.
8 Advertisement in Winnipeg Free Press, November 24, 1933.
9 Winnipeg Free Press, November 8, 1934.
10 Winnipeg Tribune, November 27, 1931.
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tax burden from workers to businesses.11 In opposition to the Citizens’
belief that the city was best run as a business, the ILP argued that munici-
pal government existed to serve the needs of the people, not of capital.
In the years following the General Strike, Citizen aldermen generally
outnumbered labour aldermen. This remained true until 1934, when
there were equal numbers of labour and Citizen representatives on
council.12 The mayor in 1934 was Ralph Webb, a Citizen, who could cast
the deciding vote in favour of the Citizens in the case of a tie. This
changed in 1935 when John Queen of the ILP was elected mayor of
Winnipeg, giving labour politicians the balance of power. In 1937,
Citizens regained control of both council and the mayoralty, although
labour politicians continued to hold a significant portion of the seats on
council. Citizens continued to control the majority of council seats for
the rest of the decade, but Queen returned to the mayoralty in 1938, a
post he held until 1942.
Winnipeg was particularly hard hit by the economic turmoil of the
1930s. After experiencing a rapid decline between 1929 and 1933,
Winnipeg’s economy rebounded only slightly over the rest of the
decade, not returning to pre-1929 levels till the 1940s.13 The value of pro-
ducts manufactured in the city plunged from $109.3 million in 1929 to
$56 million by 1932, while wages fell by 26.34 per cent between 1931
and 1936.14 The municipal government struggled to cope with the
ensuing costs of unemployment relief, which peaked at $1.8 million in
1935, thus limiting its ability to respond to other problems facing the
city.15 In a 1937 report, Graham Towers, president of the Bank of
Canada, wrote that Manitoba had been affected worse by the
Depression than nearly anywhere else in the country.16
11 Weekly News, November 8, 1929 and October 26, 1928; Winnipeg Tribune, November 21 and 24,
1934.
12 I use the term “labour aldermen” loosely in this context to refer not only to ILP aldermen but also to
communists and an independent alderman who had previously been a member of the ILP and
continued to support most ILP policies.
13 Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC], RG27, vol. 3355, file 14, “Indexing Numbers of
Employment.” If 1933 employment levels equalled 100, the respective rates were 140.4 for 1929,
134.9 for 1930, 115.9 for 1931, 107.3 for 1932, 100 for 1933, 103.1 for 1934, 109.6 for 1935, and
114.4 for 1936.
14 John Kendle, John Bracken: A Political Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979),
p. 127; Report of the Royal Commission on the Municipal Finances and Administration of the City
of Winnipeg, 1937, H. C. Goldenberg, Chairman (Winnipeg: King’s Printer, 1939), pp. 7–8, 10.
15 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Finance, Winnipeg City Council, 1936, p. 31. In 1935 the bill
for unemployment relief was $1,886,504 and in 1936 it was $1,604,040. By comparison, the second
highest category of expenditure was health services on which the city spent $589,050 and $615,812
in 1935 and 1936 respectively. Upwards of 90,000 relief cases were reported throughout the
province, causing tremendous financial hardship for both the municipal and provincial
governments. See LAC, RG27, vol. 3355, file 14, “Indexing Numbers of Employment.”
16 Kendle, John Bracken, p. 153.
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Domestic and International Influences on Housing Policy
Canada had several models from which to choose as governments con-
sidered providing support for housing initiatives. Schemes from continen-
tal Europe were generally regarded as overly socialist, with only the
British and American approaches receiving serious consideration by
Canadian reformers. The British model impressed Canadians because, in
the 14 years between 1919 and 1933, over one million houses had been
constructed with state assistance, more than half of the houses built in
Britain over that period.17 It allowed for municipal intervention in the
housing market to provide for the general needs of the working class
and to focus on slum clearance and rebuilding for the very poor.18
Although some Labour municipal governments in Britain followed more
socialist policies, conservative organizations in Canada believed that the
British model separated the spheres of public and private enterprise so
that the two were not in direct competition. The public sphere was
limited to slum clearance and the provision of cheap housing at low
rentals to those who could not afford market rates.19
The American approach to housing has been described as “private
business with a public purpose.”20 The New Deal established a Housing
Authority as part of the Public Works Administration to work on slum
clearance and develop housing projects where local agencies were
unable or unwilling to act.21 Organizations could obtain money from the
United States Housing Authority by raising 10 per cent of the funds them-
selves and 20 per cent from other levels of government, paying the prevail-
ing wages in their community, renting to only the lowest income group, and
eliminating one substandard dwelling for each new one developed.22
The American government also established the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) to offer mortgage insurance, promote long-term
amortized mortgages, and rationalize methods of property appraisal.23
17 James Craig, “What Can Be Learned from State Housing in Great Britain and the United States,”
Journal of the Royal Architectural Institute of Canada (May 1934), p. 79. Of the 2,062,000 houses built
between 1919 and 1933, 1,122,000 had received state assistance worth a total of £149,000,000.
18 Colin Pooley, ed., Housing Strategies in Europe, 1880–1930 (Leicester: Leicester University Press,
1992), p. 89.
19 City of Winnipeg Archives [hereafter COWA], Housing Folder 10, Winnipeg Board of Trade,
“Housing Conditions in Winnipeg,” June 10, 1937.
20 LAC, Accession #1987–88/146, Box 11, Housing Folder 2, Citizens Committee on Housing, Halifax,
“Housing in Halifax: A Report,” p. 25.
21 University of Toronto, Centre for Urban and Community Studies, Urban Policy Centre, Report of the
Lieutenant-Governor’s Committee on Housing Conditions in Toronto, p. 90, accessed from http://
www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/policyarchives/1934HerbertBruce.pdf.
22 COWA, Housing Folder 30, Leon F. Keyserling, “Low Rent Housing Builds on Sound Money,”
Municipal News, October 1939, p. 4.
23 Richard Harris, “Housing and Social Policy: An Historical Perspective of Canadian-American
Differences – A Comment,” Urban Studies, vol. 36 (June 1999), p. 1170.
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Federal money was readily available to municipal and private projects to
begin new housing developments aimed at low-income Americans.
A flurry of reports from major urban centres, particularly in the East,
drove housing to the forefront of public policy in the early to mid-1930s.
The Halifax Citizens Committee on Housing published the first major
report of the decade in 1932. Rather than adopting a European-style
socialist housing plan or the American capitalist model, the Halifax
Citizens Committee proposed that the government follow a middle path.
It recommended that the provincial government provide low-interest
loans to private companies on the condition that the houses produced
were rented at low rates. This proposal represented a compromise
between a private, market-based ideology and a public system and indi-
cated that there was an increasing willingness to embrace state partici-
pation in the economy.24
The Bruce Report, published by a committee established by the
Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario, Herbert Bruce, analysed numerous
dwellings in Toronto in 1934. Of the houses investigated by the report,
96 per cent fell below the minimum standard of amenities while three-
quarters fell below minimum health standards.25 To meet the steep
demand for additional dwelling units, the report advocated publicly
owned and subsidized rental housing.26 The cost of rehabilitating existing
houses in Toronto to a minimum standard, let alone alleviating the
housing shortage, was estimated at approximately $12 million.27
Reforming housing would clearly be an expensive proposition.
An investigation into housing in Montreal, completed by the Montreal
Board of Trade and the Civic Improvement League in 1935, argued that
the provision of basic shelter was a public utility.28 Through a system of cor-
porate ownership and collective management, the Montreal report pro-
posed that 4,000 houses be built annually on fringe land for the next 20
years.29 Meanwhile, the joint committee proposed that 40 city blocks and
18,000 people should be targeted for slum clearance efforts.30
Nevertheless, like the Halifax Citizens Committee, the Montreal board
24 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 69.
25 Report of the Lieutenant-Governor’s Committee on Housing Conditions in Toronto, p. 18. A
satisfactory dwelling place was deemed to be one that was free from serious dampness and
protected from precipitation and wind; was adequately lighted, heated, and ventilated; was
properly drained and furnished with sanitary conveniences; had a place to prepare and cook food
and a cool place to store food; and was capable of being kept free of rats and other vermin (p. 14).
26 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 69.
27 Report of the Lieutenant-Governor’s Committee on Housing Conditions in Toronto, p. 112.
28 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 72.
29 LAC, RG19, vol. 706, file 203–1A, Joint Committee of the Montreal Board of Trade and the City
Improvement League, “A Report on Housing and Slum Clearance for Montreal,” March 1935, p. 7.
30 Ibid., p. 6.
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rejected a European approach, which it described as being “over gener-
ous” and “highly extravagant.”31 Instead, the Montreal committee pro-
moted a British approach of low-interest loans to municipal housing
authorities and private building societies.
Those who supported the introduction of a housing scheme believed
that Canada was far behind the rest of the world. The Winnipeg Free
Press proposed that “Canadian pride should desire Canada to be
removed from the bad eminence which long neglect of housing conditions
has given her, as compared with every other civilized country.”32 Compared
to other Western nations, the Free Press argued, “Canada alone has lagged
behind. She has neglected this basically important health and social
problem and has done virtually nothing.”33 The Royal Architectural
Institute of Canada also criticized Canada’s shortcomings, pointing out
that not only had all other Western nations adopted housing plans, but
that Canada could not possibly be seen as fighting the depression as
long as it did not attempt to eradicate slums and improve housing con-
ditions.34 For housing reformers, the lack of a housing programme in
Canada was a national embarrassment, particularly considering that
other Western nations had accepted housing reform as a responsibility
of governments.
The Federal Government’s Response
The only federal housing programme in Canada prior to the 1930s was
established after the First World War when the federal government set
aside $25 million for loans to provinces to build housing. Those loans
enabled 179 municipalities to build 6,200 housing units.35 The only
people, however, who could take advantage of the programme were
“white collar men . . . men who had standing salaries.”36 Indeed, only the
top 20 per cent of income-earners could afford to build a home under
the plan.37 In Winnipeg, the loan programme led to the creation of the
Winnipeg Housing Commission (WHC). With WHC assistance, 712
homes were built in the city between 1920 and 1923, and the programme
proved to be a great success in Winnipeg. Not only was the WHC profit-
able (unlike similar organizations in other cities), but, by 1937, it had
31 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 72.
32 Winnipeg Free Press, January 19, 1938.
33 Winnipeg Free Press, March 29, 1937.
34 “What Can Be Learned from State Housing in Great Britain and the United States?” Journal of the
Royal Architectural Institute of Canada (May 1934), p. 79; Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 70.
35 Hulchanski, “The 1935 Dominion Housing Act,” p. 22.
36 Alexander Officer, House of Commons Special Committee on Housing, “Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence No. 6,” March 21, 1935, p. 174.
37 Alvin Finkel, Social Policy and Practice in Canada: A History (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 2006), p. 99.
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generated over $1 million in tax revenue for the city.38 However, the
working class could not afford WHC loans. The lone attempt to address
housing problems prior to the Great Depression, therefore, was limited
in scope and failed to aid those who needed assistance to acquire housing.
The federal government only reluctantly began to address the issue of
housing in 1935. Previously, it had suggested that housing was a provincial
and municipal responsibility.39 Nevertheless, a House of Commons Special
Committee on Housing was established in the spring of 1935. Nearly all
the witnesses who testified before the Housing Committee affirmed the
need for a national social housing policy. Such a policy, it was proposed,
would immediately contribute to alleviating the unemployment crisis
that the country was facing. Construction in Canada had sunk to one-
fifth of 1929 levels by 1934. Since construction provides economic spinoffs
for numerous other industries, reinvigorating the building market was seen
as one way of revitalizing the economy.40 Witnesses estimated that 93,000
people who had worked in construction were now unemployed and
would, therefore, benefit from such a plan.41 A Canadian housing plan, wit-
nesses proposed, was not only necessary as a solution to address housing
shortages across the country, but also would be a means of solving the
unemployment problem.
The committee proposed that the “formulation, institution, and pursuit of
a policy of adequate housing should be a social responsibility.”42 Furthermore,
the committee argued, “there is no apparent prospect for the low rental
housing need being met through unaided private enterprise, building for
profit.”43 It recommended that the federal government establish a Housing
Authority with the power to initiate, direct, and approve projects to assist
urban and rural housing. This Housing Authority would negotiate with
38 Winnipeg Free Press, July 18, 1935; COWA, Housing Folder 10, “Memorandum for Mayor Warriner
Re: Winnipeg Housing Plan,” November 15, 1937; COWA, Housing Folder 10, R. A. Sara, “Address
Before the Technical Bureau, Winnipeg Board of Trade,” April 1937.
39 James Struthers, No Fault of their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State, 1914–1941
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), p. 209.
40 O. J. Firestone, The Labour Value of the Building Dollar: Some Aspects of the Results of Eight Years
Administration Under the Dominion Housing Act, 1935, the Home Improvement Loans Guarantee
Act, 1937, the National Housing Act, 1938, the Home Extension Plan, 1942, and the Housing
Conversion Plan, 1943 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier for the Housing Administration, Department
of Finance, 1943), p. 7. If the gross value of construction contracts awarded in 1929 equalled 100,
the total was 79.3 for 1930, 54.7 for 1931, 23.0 for 1932, 16.9 for 1933, 21.8 for 1934, 27.8 for
1935, 28.2 for 1936, 38.9 for 1937, 32.5 for 1938, and 32.5 for 1939. Once the war began, these
numbers improved significantly but still did not reach pre-Depression levels. The value was 60.0 in
1940 and 68.3 in 1941.
41 House of Commons Special Committee on Housing, “Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 11,
Third and Final Report,” April 11, 1935 – April 15, 1935, p. 372.
42 Ibid., p. 378.
43 Ibid., p. 378.
400 Histoire sociale / Social History
provincial or municipal governments or private societies to promote construc-
tion or the rehabilitation of existing buildings. Finally, the committee con-
cluded that the Housing Authority’s first priority would be to rehabilitate
existing housing, but that new buildings could be erected where necessary.44
Nevertheless, the committee endeavoured to maintain a separation of the
private and public spheres by limiting public assistance to homes valued at
less than $3,500. Housing assistance, it argued, should only be provided to
those who could not afford it themselves.45
Canada’s first noteworthy housing legislation was passed in 1935. A part
of R. B. Bennett’s “New Deal,” the Dominion Housing Act (DHA) was
intended to stimulate construction for the purposes of relieving unemploy-
ment and to allow those with small or moderate incomes to have homes of
their own.46 In shaping the DHA, Bennett and his cabinet essentially
ignored the recommendations of the recently completed Special
Committee on Housing. Instead, they adopted proposals made by the
Dominion Mortgage and Insurance Association (DMIA), an organization
made up of Canada’s largest lending institutions. The result was a radically
different plan than the one proposed by the Housing Committee, focusing
entirely on a private, market-based solution to the nation’s housing
problems.47
DHA loans were to be made at an interest rate of 5 per cent. Sixty per
cent of a project’s cost was to be lent by an approved financial institution,
20 per cent was to be provided by the government, and the remaining 20
per cent was to be paid for by the homebuilder. The loans were amortized
over 20 years, with recipients paying monthly, rather than the semi-annual
or annual payments that were common at the time. The government also
agreed to provide some security for the financial institution’s portion of
the loan, thus minimizing the potential for loss and, theoretically, giving
a wider swath of society access to private credit.48 This meant that financial
institutions had to give mortgages at a lower rate than normal, but were
able to carry less risk. Conceptually, the DHA was similar in many ways
to the American FHA, although its emphasis on free enterprise was
even greater than in the American legislation.49 The Act also called for
44 Ibid., pp. 379–380.
45 Ibid., pp. 371, 378.
46 LAC, RG19, vol. 706, file 203–1A, “The Dominion Housing Act,” p. 1.
47 Arthur Ganong, who had been the chair of the Special Committee on Housing, criticized his own
government’s policy on the DHA, proclaiming,“I must say that it makes no provision for housing
the low paid worker” (quoted in Hulchanski, “The 1935 Dominion Housing Act,” p. 23).
48 F. W. Nicolls, “Housing Developments in Canada,” Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics,
vol. 13 (May 1937), p. 204, and “An Explanation of the Dominion Housing Act,” Journal of the
Royal Architectural Institute of Canada (October 1935), pp. 166–167.
49 Richard Harris, “More American than the United States: Housing in Urban Canada in the Twentieth
Century,” Journal of Urban History, vol. 26 (May 2000), p. 469. Harris describes the DHA as a “weak
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the appointment of an economic council to study the housing issue. The
council, however, was never created. Shortly after the passage of the legis-
lation, the Bennett government was voted out of office and the incoming
Liberal government had little interest in the council or the broader issues it
was meant to address.50
In his 1988 dissertation on the topic, John Belec suggests that the DHA
represented “one of the earliest, and most significant, pieces of state
housing legislation in the creation of the modern Canadian housing
market.” Additionally, Belec proposes that the DHA played a pivotal
role in the development of the modern mortgage system.51 In contrast,
Alvin Finkel argues that the DHA merely “embodied the major proposals
of the Dominion Mortgage and Insurance Association and the Ontario
Mortgage Companies Association.”52 Percy Nobbs, a well-respected
housing scholar and one of Canada’s leading housing architects at the
time, referred to the DHA as a “comedy of errors” because it merely
served to build houses for the wealthy, not for those who needed them.53
John Bacher expresses similar sentiments in his 1993 analysis of the
DHA, suggesting that it was a “caricature of the inequities in Canadian
society” because it benefited only the rich and middle class while being
“wrapped in the rhetoric of concern for the underprivileged.”54 Similarly,
David Hulchanski has argued that “a basic problem of the DHA and
the 1938 NHA . . . is that these programs have in fact been influenced, if
not designed, by ‘mortgage men,’ often unhampered by . . . the housing
realities faced by lower income classes.”55 The primary motivation of the
DHA, argues Hulchanski, was to assist the profitability of private firms
in the housing market rather than developing housing for those in need.56
Numerous problems plagued the implementation of the DHA. Several
lending institutions refused to make any loans whatsoever because the
interest they could charge was capped at 5 per cent.57 The institutions
imitation” of the FHA (Creeping Conformity, p. 127). He also observes that the FHA was far more
successful in loaning money to a broad social spectrum than Canadian DHA efforts (“Housing and
Social Policy,” p. 1171).
50 Kamal S. Sayegh, Housing: A Canadian Perspective (Ottawa: Academy Books, 1987), p. 124. Indeed,
despite opposition to the Act from many Liberal MPs, it was supported by William Lyon Mackenzie
King (who was Leader of the Official Opposition at the time) because he appreciated its limited
scope (Hulchanski, “The 1935 Dominion Housing Act,” p. 28).
51 John Patrick Belec, “The Dominion Housing Act: A Study of the Origins of Canadian Housing
Policy” (PhD dissertation, Queen’s University, 1988), p. 16.
52 Alvin Finkel, Business and Social Reform in the Thirties (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1979), p. 104.
53 Montreal Gazette, January 17, 1936.
54 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 93.
55 Hulchanski, “The 1935 Dominion Housing Act,” p. 38.
56 Ibid., p. 24.
57 Robert B. Bryce, Maturing in Hard Times: Canada’s Department of Finance through the Great
Depression (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986), p. 166.
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that did participate refused to make any loans that were perceived to be
high risk. This meant the exclusion of people with low incomes as well
as whole geographical regions of the country. Western Canada was, for
the most part, ignored by the lending agencies as companies did not
want to lend money at 5 per cent because they feared it would disrupt
their higher-interest lending operations.58 The result was a highly imbal-
anced distribution of funds. By the end of 1937, Nova Scotia had received
$1,259,054, Quebec just over $4.5 million, and Ontario just over $5.5
million. Despite the severity of the housing crisis in Manitoba, the pro-
vince only received $308,314 to build 48 housing units. Meanwhile,
Saskatchewan received $8,200 to build two units and Alberta received
no loans.59 The Mortgage and Trust Companies Association of British
Columbia reported that large financial institutions were waiting to
implement the DHA in the West, wanting to see first whether the plan
was profitable in the East.60
Not only was the DHA a dismal failure in the West, but it also failed
to assist those with low incomes. A premonition of things to come was
the first unit built with DHA funds, constructed in the prestigious
Montreal municipality of Westmount for a Montreal Canadiens hockey
star.61 Of the 3,018 units built with DHA loans by 1938, only 66 were
valued at less than $2,000. Conversely, 1,240 units valued at more than
$4,000, well beyond the reach of a working-class Canadian, were built.62
As Alexander Officer, head of the municipal health department in
Winnipeg, pointed out, the DHA was only attractive to those who had
some capital to construct homes of their own.63 Consequently, the DHA
subsidized house construction for the middle and upper classes, while
ignoring the shortage of affordable housing for the working class, which
was the crux of the nation’s housing crisis. The problems that Winnipeg
was encountering in providing reasonable housing for its low-income resi-
dents were not addressed by the DHA.
58 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 112.
59 Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, Urban Public Housing Archive,
F. W. Nicolls, “Housing in Canada, 1938,” accessed from http://www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/
pdfs/policyarchives/1938FWNicolls.pdf. Based on 1931 census data, Manitoba received $0.91 in
DHA loans per capita, while British Columbia received $4.09, Nova Scotia received $3.19, and
Ontario received $2.93. Loans were not provided in Alberta because of legislation that protected
farmers and home owners from foreclosure. See Donald G. Wetherell and Irene Kmet, Homes in
Alberta: Building, Trends, and Design, 1870–1967 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1991),
p. 185.
60 Wade, Housing for All, p. 69.
61 Hulchanski, “The 1935 Dominion Housing Act,” p. 34. The name of the hockey player was not given.
62 Nicolls, “Housing in Canada, 1938.”
63 COWA, Public Health and Welfare File 1535, City of Winnipeg Health Department, “Report of the
Nineteenth Annual Survey of Vacant Houses and Vacant Suites in the City Also Total Housing
Accommodation and Remarks on Housing in General,” January 1937.
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Although R. B. Bennett and his Conservative government were swept
from power shortly after passing the DHA in 1935, the Liberal govern-
ment that succeeded them had no particular interest in a radically different
housing policy. Acting on a recommendation of the National Employment
Commission, the Liberals introduced the Home Improvement Plan to
provide loans to assist home owners to renovate their property.64 HIP
loans were provided at a discount of 3.25 per cent, which meant an effec-
tive interest rate of 6.3 per cent. Up to $2,000 could be borrowed on a
house, or $1,000 per apartment.65 Its launch in March 1937 was
accompanied by a nationwide advertising campaign.66 Within its first
year, over 28,000 loans had been distributed totalling $11,001,817.52.
Unlike the DHA, the HIP allowed Manitobans some success in accessing
these funds, as $714,959.73 was lent in the first year in the province and, by
1940, 7,668 loans had been made in Manitoba totalling $2,977,121.67
Nevertheless, similar to other housing programmes, the majority of
funds went to Ontario.68
The Home Improvement Plan was never intended to address the lack of
housing for lower-income Canadians. As Conservative MP Denton Massey
questioned, “what possible good is this plan [HIP] to the man who has
been evicted from one hovel after another?”69 HIP advertising was
aimed at the rich and upper-middle class. Advertisements portrayed
large houses, ivory fireplaces, air conditioning, crystal mirrors, garages,
and other luxuries.70 Its immediate aims were to reinvigorate the construc-
tion industry and provide employment.71
The Mackenzie King Liberals retained the DHA until 1938, when they
passed an updated version of the Act, now entitled the National Housing
Act (NHA). Although Kamal Sayegh has argued that “the NHA not only
revoked the DHA but also moved Canada firmly into the public housing
field,”72 the philosophy of the NHA largely followed that of its predeces-
sor. The focus remained on private solutions to the housing crisis. The
public funding provided in the NHA was nearly impossible to access.
Canadian federal housing policy remained focused on encouraging
64 Struthers, No Fault of their Own, p. 157.
65 Nicolls, “Housing in Canada, 1938.”
66 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 103; Wade, Houses for All, p. 71. HIP ads ran frequently in the
Winnipeg Free Press and Tribune, portraying large houses with several bedrooms, decorative
fireplaces, garages, and other accoutrements of a middle- or upper-class lifestyle.
67 LAC, RG19, vol. 706, file 203–1a–3; COWA, File 7119.
68 H. Peter Oberlander and Arthur L. Fallick, Housing a Nation: The Evolution of Canadian Housing
Policy (Vancouver: Centre for Human Settlements, University of British Columbia, 1992), p. 19.
69 LAC, RG27, vol. 3347, file 2, Denton Massey, p. 807.
70 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 104; Winnipeg Free Press, March 22, 1937.
71 LAC, RG27, vol. 3355, file 3, “Home Improvement Plan.”
72 Savegh, Housing, p. 125.
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home ownership, rather than investing in government-owned housing pro-
jects.73 Deputy Finance Minister W. C. Clark proclaimed that the NHA
allowed the government to say that it was “assisting the man of moderate
means to have a home of his own.”74 Rather than a system of public own-
ership, private loans made with public assistance ensured that individuals,
rather than governments, owned the homes that were built under the
DHA and NHA.
The new Act liberalized the lending terms of the DHA and provided
government security for the loans. F. W. Nicolls, director of housing for
the Department of Finance, pointed out that the NHA was not “social
legislation”: “We expect to get back every dollar put up.”75 The NHA
also offered federal money to pay a portion of the municipal taxes on
property for three years, if municipalities agreed to sell that land for the
nominal price of $50. In contrast to the DHA, there was a provision to
allow the Minister of Finance to loan any unappropriated money in the
Consolidated Revenue Fund (not exceeding $30 million) to local
housing authorities to build low-cost rental housing.76 This provision,
theoretically, created the possibility for municipal governments to
borrow from the federal government to create low-income housing. This,
however, required enabling legislation from provincial governments. It
also allowed the federal government to argue that it had made financial
assistance for housing available to a much larger proportion of the popu-
lation than was eligible under the DHA.
The government of the time claimed, as have some historians, that the
NHA was a success. Kamal Sayegh argues that “if the Act was intended
to spread low-cost housing across Canada, it succeeded.” He points out
that over 50 per cent of NHA loans were for homes valued at less than
$3,000, while 93 per cent were for projects valued at less than $4,000.77
Across the country, numerous regions benefited significantly from the
NHA. Over $25.5 million was spent on projects built in Ontario, while
nearly $9 million was spent in Quebec. British Columbia ($7.5 million)
and the Maritime provinces also enjoyed many benefits from the NHA.
Richard Harris, although critical of the NHA, acknowledges that it did
lead to a “small spate of construction” prior to Canada’s entrance into
the Second World War in 1939.78 Yet, similar to the DHA, the NHA gen-
erally ignored the West and low-income Canadians. A cartoon from the
73 Albert Rose, Canadian Housing Policies (1935–1980) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980),
p. 19.
74 LAC, RG19, vol. 706, file 203–1A–3, memorandum from W. C. Clark to F. W. Nicolls.
75 Wade, Housing for All, p. 88.
76 Sayegh, Housing, pp. 125–126; Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 117.
77 Sayegh, Housing, p. 126.
78 Richard Harris and Doris Ragonetti, “Where Credit is Due: Residential Mortgage Finance in
Canada, 1901 to 1954,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, vol. 16 (March 1998), p. 230.
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Winnipeg Free Press illustrates Western frustration with federal housing
schemes (see Figure 1).
The NHA failed low-income and Western Canadians in several ways.
Despite provisions within the NHA that allowed for loans for low-cost
rental housing projects, not a single municipality took advantage of
the programme before it expired in 1940. As a result, no low-income
housing projects were undertaken as a result of the NHA. Secondly,
under the NHA, wide swaths of the country were once again ignored
by financial institutions. Alberta did not receive a single loan under
the DHA or NHA. Saskatchewan, which had received only two DHA
loans, fared better under the NHA but not substantially so.
Meanwhile, the city of Vancouver received twice as many NHA loans
as all of Manitoba combined.79 Federal officials blamed the shortage of
construction on the builders (who, they said, refused to reduce building
costs) and on provincial and municipal authorities for not being eager to
take advantage of the NHA provisions.80 In Winnipeg, however, the city
continued to request federal funds for housing throughout the late 1930s,
only to be routinely denied by the federal government. Once again,
federal housing legislation had failed to address the needs of Western
Canada.
Early Developments in Winnipeg (1934–1936)
By 1934, many Winnipeg politicians were stressing the need to develop
municipal housing policies. Mayor Ralph Webb commented, “I have
been in many cities of the world and some of the slum conditions I have
seen in Winnipeg are about as bad as can be found anywhere.”81 A munici-
pal survey of 673 slum houses that year found 83 families living in single
rooms, 94 families living in two-room suites, and 71 families living in
three-room suites.82 While this survey should not be taken as an accurate
portrayal of the city’s housing stock as a whole, it does demonstrate that
some neighbourhoods of Winnipeg were experiencing acute overcrowding.
Winnipeggers were also paying the highest proportion of their income on
rent in the country.83
79 LAC, RG19, vol. 706, file 203–1A. In 1931, Vancouver had a population of 246,593 while Manitoba
had a population of 700,319.
80 LAC, RG19, vol. 706, file 203–1A, Taggard Smyth, “The Housing Problem.”
81 Winnipeg Free Press, December 5, 1933.
82 COWA, Public Health and Welfare File 1330, Alexander Officer, “Report of the Fifteenth Annual
Survey of Vacant Houses and Vacant Suites in the City Also Total Housing Accommodation and
Remarks on Housing in General,” January 1933.
83 Harris, “Working-Class Home Ownership,” p. 128. Winnipeggers paid an average of 26 per cent of
household income on rent, tied with Montreal for the highest in the country among major urban
centres.
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In the summer of 1934, city council developed a $1.5 million self-liqui-
dating plan to provide units to be rented for between $20 and $35 per
month.84 The site, which encompassed two full city blocks, was located
only one and a half miles from downtown and was near industrial
areas, thus providing easy access to employment. Architects Lawrence
Green, Cecil Blankstein, G. Leslie Russell, Ralph Ham, and Herbert
Moody proposed building a ring of three-storey apartment buildings
around the perimeter of the site with two-storey row houses grouped
around service drives in the middle, accommodating up to 588 families.
The rest of the grounds, 7.5 acres of the total 16.75, was set aside for
parks and vegetable plots. A shopping area stood at the main entrance
and office space for doctors, dentists, and other professionals was
Figure 1: This cartoon from the Winnipeg Free Press illustrates Western frustration with
federal housing schemes. (Source: Winnipeg Free Press, March 17, 1937).
84 “Proposed Low-Cost Housing Development for the City of Winnipeg,” Journal of the Royal
Architectural Institute of Canada (July-August 1934), pp. 109–112. It is interesting to note that, of
the 1634-acre site, seven and a half acres were to be dedicated to open parks.
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included to provide amenities for the residents, with the revenue earned
by the stores to be used to sponsor a community hall and day nursery
(see Figure 2).85
Despite support from local politicians and national organizations such as
the Royal Architectural Institute of Canada, the plan was never carried
out due to significant opposition from within the city. The North
Winnipeg Taxpayers Association, for example, wrote to council to
protest the decision to build houses because, the group argued, there
were already numerous vacant houses in the city.86 Although city council
voted to support the $1.5 million proposal, it had no money to spend on
this, or any, housing development.87 Thus it was left to wait for the
support of the federal government, which had yet to show significant inter-
est in the field of housing.88 Federal refusal to assist the project was not
Figure 2: An architectural vision for Winnipeg’s housing plan in 1934. (Source: Journal of
the Royal Architectural Institute of Canada (July-August 1934), p. 111).
85 “Proposed Low-Cost Housing Development for the City of Winnipeg,” Journal of the Royal
Architectural Institute of Canada (July-August 1934), p. 109. Although all buildings were to be
accessible by service lanes, there was to be no through traffic.
86 COWA, Council Communications File 15909, letter from the North Winnipeg Taxpayers Association
to City Council, May 15, 1934.
87 The city managed to run “balanced budgets” throughout the 1930s with the exception of money
borrowed to pay for unemployment relief. This annual loan amounted to over 10 per cent of the
city’s income. See COWA, Winnipeg City Council, Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Finance, p. 9.
88 “Webb Declares Homebuilding and Sewage Appealed,” Winnipeg Free Press, June 27, 1934; Bacher,
Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 73.
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based solely on national policy, however. Prime Minister R. B. Bennett
bluntly admitted that he had considered supporting the city’s request
but had received petitions from local residents asking him not to assist
the municipal plan because it might interfere with property rentals in
Winnipeg.89 He explained that the “lack of support from Winnipeg made
it impossible to proceed with [the] project.”90 Landlords actively sought
to avoid competing with the municipal government for tenants, and the
proposal died when the Bennett government refused to provide the
necessary funding.
Housing remained an important political issue in Winnipeg in 1935. For
the first time since the General Strike, labour aldermen held the majority
of council seats, and the city had a labour mayor. Upon his election to the
mayoralty, John Queen of the ILP declared, “[T]here is undoubtedly a
strong case for a housing scheme.”91 By March, a proposal was in place
to borrow $2 million from the Dominion government to build dwellings
on city land in the Norquay Park district of the city, between Granville
and Disraeli Streets near downtown. Importantly, the committee
members believed that the money should be spent without a municipal
referendum.92 The hope was that, since the federal government was consid-
ering funding housing, the project might be able to start that summer.93
The plan was not without controversy. Alderman Cecil Rice-Jones con-
demned it as “an absolute outrage” that would “break one-third of the tax-
payers!”94 Other Citizen aldermen were equally critical of the plan. James
Barry worried that building affordable rental units would depreciate the
value of nearby better housing. F. H. Davidson argued that it was
outside the city’s jurisdiction to build houses to sell or rent.
Additionally, he declared, the type of people who would live in such
houses would just ruin them anyway.95 Opposition to the $2 million plan,
therefore, was centred on financial concerns, whether for the city, the tax-
payers, or the surrounding property owners.
The city, however, could not borrow money without a referendum of
ratepayers. To avoid such a referendum, provincial approval was required.
The provincial government in Manitoba had a reputation for being “cau-
tious, reasonable, and pragmatic,” and its overwhelmingly rural members
89 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 76.
90 Winnipeg Free Press, June 22, 1934.
91 Winnipeg Free Press, December 27, 1934.
92 Winnipeg Free Press, February 21 and March 7, 1935; Winnipeg Tribune, February 21, 1935. ILP
Aldermen Morris Gray and James Simpkin were joined by Communist Jacob Penner in support
of the proposal. Cecil Gunn, a “Citizen” alderman, was opposed. Margaret McWilliams, who was
not officially among the “Citizen” aldermen but often voted with them, abstained.
93 “Council Favors Housing Plan Without Vote,” Winnipeg Free Press, March 19, 1935.
94 Winnipeg Tribune, March 7, 1935.
95 Winnipeg Tribune, March 12, 1935.
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were not keen to support what they deemed to be extravagant urban
spending.96 Thus, when Bill 98, which sought to authorize the city to
create a debt for the purpose of house construction without a referendum,
was defeated in its second reading by the Manitoba legislature, the plan
died.97
The demise of the $2 million plan in 1935 did not mean the end of the
housing debate in the city. In the summer of that year, Alderman Margaret
McWilliams released a report outlining the impact of low-quality housing
on Winnipeg neighbourhoods. McWilliams, the only female alderman at
the time, tended to vote with the Citizens, but also was supportive of a
high level of social services and centralized planning.98 Her report
studied two areas in poor, working-class neighbourhoods and compared
that data to the city as a whole.99 She found that rates of disease, mortality,
Children’s Aid cases, arrests, and delinquency were all appreciably higher
in poor neighbourhoods (see Table 1). She concluded that the two high-
lighted areas cost the city $639,000 to service, whereas the rest of the
city cost only $612,000 despite the fact that the two areas had only one-
third of the total population. These findings provided an additional argu-
ment to campaigners for public housing: not only would the rents charged
as part of a housing project make it self-liquidating, but the project would
also pay off in reduced medical and police costs. Furthermore, her study
quantified the link between poor housing and disease as well as, in the
minds of many Winnipeggers, between housing and delinquency.
The medical danger of overcrowded housing conditions had been widely
known for a long time, but, as McWilliams cited in her report, people were
growing increasingly concerned about the moral consequences of living
in slum conditions. Slums were seen as not only an economic or health
problem, but also a moral one.100 Consequently, social reformers believed
that social and moral reform were inseparable.101 Poor housing was blamed
for a breakdown in the family and, consequently, an increase in delin-
quency. The 1932 report on housing conditions in Halifax commented
that the “dark rooms and halls, common toilets and sinks, the enforced
96 Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987),
p. 403.
97 COWA, Housing Folder 10, R. A. Sara, “Address Before the Technical Bureau, Winnipeg Board of
Trade,” April 8, 1937.
98 Mary Kinnear, Margaret McWilliams: An Interwar Feminist (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1991), pp. 127–128.
99 Area One ran from the Assiniboine River to Notre Dame Avenue and from the Red River to
Sherbrook Street. Area Two included from Notre Dame Avenue to the CPR tracks and Burrows
Avenue and from the Red River to Sherbrook Street and Main Street.
100 Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885–
1925 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991), p. 132.
101 Ibid., p. 47.
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sharing of rooms and beds, are fatal to ideals and to standards of decency
and a menace to the moral growth of youth.”102 As the Free Press put it,
slum conditions “breed, prolifically, social evils of every kind.”103 The
Bruce Report in Ontario stated it even more explicitly: “Bad houses are
not only a menace: they are active agents of destruction. . . . They
destroy morality and family ties. They destroy the basis of society itself
by their destruction of self-respect and their promotion of delinquency
and crime.”104 The struggle for adequate housing was perceived as not
only being about stopping the spread of physical diseases, but addressing
the supposed moral decline of the next generation.
A further problem facing Winnipeg that came to the fore in 1935 was
“house farming.” Individuals would rent a house and then derive income
by subletting several parts of the home to different families. During his tes-
timony before the House of Commons Special Committee on Housing,
Alexander Officer cited the example of an individual who rented a house
for $100 and then rented out each room to a different family, collecting
$227. This practice often extended to renting parts of buildings that were
not suitable for habitation. People were regularly found living in poorly lit
and ventilated attics and basements. These were dangerous in case of fire,
insufferably hot in summer, and unbearably cold in winter; they provided
little daylight and presented tenants with a high risk of asphyxiation from
gas fumes. As the shortage of homes became more pressing, this practice
intensified, and more and more dwellings were “farmed.”105
With McWilliams’s report before council, there was a renewed effort to
pass housing reform legislation. In October 1935, Matthew Stobart, an ILP
TABLE 1: Data from Margaret McWilliams’ Report on Housing (1935)
Area 1 Area 2 Rest of city
Infant mortality (per 1,000 births) 58.5 52.0 42.5
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 10,000 people) 8.6 7.9 2.6
Patient days at municipal hospitals (per 1,000 people) 288 562 207
Children’s Aid cases (per 1,000 children) 36.1 67.7 14.8
Arrests (per 1,000 people) 21.1 52.2 6.5
Source: Provincial Archives of Manitoba, File 1056 G628, Margaret McWilliams, “An
Investigation into Certain Social Housing Conditions in Winnipeg.”
102 LAC, Accession #1987–88/146, box 11, Housing Folder 2, Citizens Committee on Housing,
Halifax, “Housing in Halifax; A Report,” p. 10.
103 Winnipeg Free Press, January 19, 1938.
104 Report of the Lieutenant-Governor’s Committee on Housing Conditions in Toronto.
105 Alexander Officer, House of Commons Special Committee on Housing, “Minutes and Proceedings
of Evidence, No. 6,” March 21, 1935.
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alderman, put forward a motion calling for the city to build low-cost
houses for rent or rent-purchase. The plan did not qualify under the
DHA because municipalities were not eligible loan recipients under the
Act, so the money would have to be borrowed from private sources.106
This $500,000 plan dedicated $314,000 to build 120 four-room flats, with
the balance of the money to be used for rehabilitating older housing
stock.107 The plan, known as Bylaw 14777, passed due to the labour
majority on council, with Citizen aldermen such as Cecil Rice-Jones
opposing it on the grounds that it neither made economic sense nor
addressed the greatest housing need.108 Unlike its previous effort, the
council agreed that it would only borrow money if the plan was approved
by city voters during the November elections.
The resulting referendum campaign provides an excellent illustration of
the arguments used both for and against housing projects in Winnipeg.
Labour aldermen and the Winnipeg Building Trades Council (BTC)
were the two major proponents of the housing plan. Alderman Stobart
claimed that, in some parts of the city, over 15,000 families lived in
fewer than 2,000 homes.109 Mayor John Queen, meanwhile, used evidence
from McWilliams’s report to argue that the council would actually save
money because improved housing conditions would reduce the cost of hos-
pital bills caused by the ill effects of overcrowded residences.110 A short-
term expenditure on housing, it was proposed, would save money in the
long run.
In a press release published in the Winnipeg Tribune, the BTC argued
that, although the Home and Property Owners’ Association, which the
BTC said was “composed of many real estate agents and those who do
the farming on overcrowded houses,” had declared that the housing plan
“would spell ruin for Winnipeg,” it would actually provide desperately
needed housing. The BTC was interested in improving the construction
market in the city, as its members stood to benefit directly from any
plan that promoted home-building. They pleaded with Winnipeg voters
to “create better homes. Create employment for some tried building
tradesmen and others. Give your support to the bylaw in order that
Winnipeg citizens get a chance to live in better quarters than at present
they are domiciled in.”111 Thus the housing plan generated support for
two reasons. First, it was intended to relieve the drastic shortage in afford-
able housing that existed in the city. Secondly, many hoped that an
106 Winnipeg Free Press, October 3, 1935.
107 Winnipeg Typo News, October 31, 1935.
108 Winnipeg Free Press, October 8, 1935.
109 Winnipeg Tribune, November 14, 1935. Stobart said that 15,082 families lived in 1,819 homes, an
average of approximately 8.3 families per home.
110 Winnipeg Tribune, November 15, 1935.
111 Winnipeg Tribune, November 21, 1935.
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investment in housing would provide construction jobs for Winnipeggers
at a time when employment was scarce.
The housing plan was condemned by Citizen aldermen and pro-business
community groups. Cecil Gunn, the CEC mayoral candidate in 1935,
declared that paying landlords to rehabilitate old houses would be far
sounder economically than building new homes.112 It was claimed that hun-
dreds of vacant houses already existed, and constructing new dwellings
would be an inefficient use of resources. New housing, the Winnipeg
Chamber of Commerce argued, would compete with the existing
housing stock, and, as a result, many large one-family dwellings would
cease to be revenue-bearing for landlords.113 Alderman Rice-Jones
reflected his class sensibilities when he commented during a public
meeting that no one would possibly want to live in the proposed flats, as
they were so small that the rooms were not big enough to “swing a cat
in.”114 A final Citizen argument was summed up in a letter to the
Winnipeg Tribune, in which the writer commented that, “as a crowning
insult to the intelligence of the taxpayer, these spendthrifts have asked
us to endorse a blank cheque for $500,000 to build something, some
place, some time.”115
One of the leading opponents of the housing proposal was the Home
and Property Owners’ Association (HPOA), which described the plan as
“unsound and impractical.”116 The HPOA fought on behalf of the rate-
payers (property owners) of the city. Its mission was “a substantial
reduction of property taxes as soon as possible.”117 It opposed any
measure that could lead to tax increases, whether through housing
reform, by cancelling wage rollbacks for municipal employees, or by pro-
viding additional unemployment relief. The HPOA was the most influen-
tial anti-housing organization in the 1930s, and its membership included
much of the city’s Citizen leadership.118 The activity of the HPOA is indica-
tive of the class divide in the city. While labour organizations and progress-
ive religious groups advocated housing reform, the business elite stood
staunchly against it. Not only would a municipal housing project
112 “Queen, Gunn, Council, and School Board Candidates Heard from One Platform,” Winnipeg
Tribune, November 20, 1935.
113 Public Archives of Manitoba, MG 10 A2, box 13, “Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce Minutes:
Council, Executive, General, 1931–1935.”
114 Winnipeg Tribune, November 21, 1935.
115 Winnipeg Tribune, November 16, 1935.
116 Communist Party of Canada – Manitoba Archives, Election Bulletins 1930–1935, “The Housing
Scheme,” The Home Owner, December 15, 1935, p. 1.
117 Ibid.
118 For example, long-time city Alderman Charles Simonite had previously served on the HPOA
executive. With such connections in city hall, it is not surprising that the organization wielded
significant influence.
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potentially result in a tax increase, but it would also provide competition
for the numerous landlords who were members of the HPOA.
Winnipeg’s electoral system gave property owners, not tenants, the right
to vote on financial referendums. The property-owning class therefore
voted on whether or not to spend tax money to assist those without
proper housing. Many of these voters owned rental properties and were
not keen on competition from the municipal government. The franchise
for the referendum was so limited that, while over 53,000 electors voted
in the mayoralty election (and there were restrictions on voting in the
mayoral race as well), approximately 15,000 voted in the referendum
held simultaneously.119 Needless to say, a house construction plan was a
tough sell at the best of times, and it was particularly difficult in a city
both so divided by class and in the midst of a tremendous economic
depression. Voters overwhelmingly rejected Bylaw 14777, with 11,676
voters (71.4 per cent) opposed and only 4,674 (28.6 per cent) in
favour.120 Yet another city council effort had been stymied, this time by
the city’s property-owning class.
The overwhelming defeat of Bylaw 14777 was an obvious setback for
the cause of public housing in Winnipeg. In 1936, despite the presence
of another labour majority on council, the issue of housing was rarely men-
tioned. The Communists were the only party to put forward a motion on
the issue that year. Communist aldermen Martin Forkin and Jacob Penner
proposed that the city request provincial permission to borrow $300,000
for the purposes of re-loaning to home owners to rehabilitate their prop-
erty. The motion was defeated by thirteen votes to three, with only Morris
Gray of the ILP voting with the two Communists.121 A small local
Communist newspaper, The Crusader, attempted to keep alive the issue
of housing, and the party held meetings on the issue, but the politicians
and populace of Winnipeg were quiet on housing in 1936.122
The Housing Issue Re-awakened (1937)
It took the effort of a United Church clergyman, Reverend J. W. Clarke, to
bring the issue of housing back into prominence in Winnipeg. His
addresses to groups throughout the city brought attention to slum neigh-
bourhoods.123 These efforts were assisted by a Free Press expose´ of
housing conditions in March 1937. On March 15, the newspaper published
a story on a Barber Street tenement that housed 40 people, including 12
119 City of Winnipeg, Municipal Manual, Winnipeg, 1936, p. 139.
120 Bylaw 14777, Winnipeg Bylaws, 1935, Winnipeg City Council (Winnipeg: De Montfort Press, 1936),
p. 127.
121 COWA, “City Council Minutes,” Motion 224, March 9, 1936, p. 141.
122 See LAC, RG18, vol. 3526, “Destroy Slums! Kill TB!,” The Crusader, April 1936.
123 COWA, Housing Folder 10, “Memorandum for Mayor Warriner Re: Winnipeg Housing Plan,”
November 15, 1937.
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men living in the cellar, but that had no bath, furnace, or sink and only two
toilets.124 A day later, a terrace house on Henry Avenue with no furnace or
bath was described as holding 45 people.125 Other stories portrayed down-
town homes that often lacked plumbing, water, sewers, or electric lighting
and frequently had severe structural damage, vermin infestations, or both.
Tenants complained that their owners “milked” every penny they could
get out of the buildings and made no repairs, no matter how small.126
The newspaper called for Canada, and Winnipeg more specifically, to
move quickly to solve the problems that had been outlined. A shocked
city once again engaged in a debate over public housing reform.
A letter to the unemployment relief committee in June 1937 further
illustrates the unsanitary and crowded conditions in some downtown
accommodation. Bedbugs and cockroaches infested living spaces. In
many buildings each room was occupied by a different family, each with
a gas stove that was rarely properly ventilated. Eight to ten stoves being
used at the same time posed a serious health and fire hazard. It was
reported that families on relief with children were forced to live in attics
because landlords considered these spaces unsuitable for families not on
relief.127 Yet, because of the shortage of homes, the municipal health
department was unable to enforce its own bylaws. If it were to condemn
a house, there was no place for the residents to go, except perhaps to
another equally inadequate slum dwelling.
Municipal officials were growing increasingly frustrated with inaction on
housing. In his annual report on local housing conditions, the chief of the
municipal health department, Alexander Officer, noted, “[W]e cannot
effectively deal with the overcrowded conditions under which many
families are obliged to live, groups of families in dwellings originally con-
structed and equipped for one family only, until relief is provided in the
erection of suitable places for these people to live.”128 He also wrote
about the “costliness of the present situation in lives, health, morals, and
money.”129 Not only were the monetary costs of the slum neighbourhoods
expensive (whether in terms of health, social services, or policing), but it
was perceived that the physical health and morality of slum-dwellers
were negatively affected.
124 Winnipeg Free Press, March 15, 1937.
125 Winnipeg Free Press, March 16, 1937.
126 Winnipeg Free Press, March 13, 1937.
127 COWA, Public Health and Welfare File 1084, letter from Mr. Argue to the Unemployment Relief
Committee, Subcommittee on Housing, June 28, 1937.
128 COWA, Public Health and Welfare Folder 1535, Alexander Officer, “Report of the Nineteenth
Annual Survey of Vacant Houses and Vacant Suites in the City Also Total Housing
Accommodation and Remarks on Housing in General,” January 1937.
129 Ibid.
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Housing advocates throughout the 1930s had questioned whether
housing for low-income people could ever be provided through private
enterprise without the assistance of the state. In 1936, city council
adopted a report of the Special Committee on Housing Conditions that
claimed that there was “no apparent prospect of the low-rental housing
need being met through unaided private enterprise.”130 The lack of faith
in the market to solve the crisis was widespread by 1937. Alexander
Officer declared that the problem could not be successfully addressed by
“private enterprise alone, and indeed it can only be adequately solved
by a state-aided scheme.”131 The annual report of the Winnipeg Housing
Commission for 1937 also suggested that “it would appear somewhat
doubtful whether any plan for improved housing for those in the lower
wage brackets can be made self-supporting without public subsidy in some
form or other.”132 An increasing number of people in the city realized that
some government action would be necessary if a solution was to be found.
Numerous groups took up the issue of housing and lobbied the city to
take drastic and immediate action. The Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation, Labour Women’s Federation of Manitoba, Winnipeg
General Ministerial Association, Greater Winnipeg Youth Council, the
Young Men’s Section of the Board of Trade, and the Central Council of
Social Agencies of Manitoba all lobbied council for a housing project.133
The press, particularly the Free Press, provided favourable coverage of
these endeavours and publicized the activities of pro-housing groups.
There remained opposition in the city, but, by 1937, far more people
were aware of the importance of housing, and a wide variety of groups
were encouraging their government to pursue a more aggressive housing
policy.
The city responded by requesting that the federal government loan the
city $400,000 at a low rate of interest and provide an additional $100,000 in
the form of an unemployment relief work project. This money would be
used either to build or to loan up to 90 per cent of the cost of dwellings
of the kind desired by low-wage earners.134 Labour aldermen opposed
the idea that money could be lent to private businesses as they wanted
130 COWA, Housing Folder 7, “Report of Special Committee on Housing Conditions.” Jill Wade has
demonstrated how the frustration with federal housing legislation led community groups to
launch campaigns for social housing in Vancouver (Houses for All), p. 74. The situation appears
similar to the conditions described here for Winnipeg.
131 Alexander Officer, “Housing in Winnipeg,” Social Welfare (June-September 1937), p. 61.
132 COWA, Housing Folder 24, Winnipeg Housing Commission, “Annual Report,” December 31, 1937,
p. 31.
133 COWA, Housing Folder 7, “Housing and Slum Conditions: Excerpts from Minutes of Council,
1937.”
134 COWA, Housing Folder 10, R. A. Sara, “Address Before the Technical Bureau, Winnipeg Board of
Trade,” April 8, 1937.
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the city to own houses built with public money. Meanwhile, on the right,
Alderman F. G. Thompson argued that the scheme constituted a threat
against present house owners and said that the city would never have
stood for it had it not come up “under the camouflage of ‘slum clear-
ance’.”135 Outside the council, numerous business-oriented individuals
and groups took up the fight against this proposal. The HPOA described
city council’s housing proposal as a “muddled affair” that had no clear
direction or purpose. Its leaders argued that many people were coming
to the city for the purpose of getting unemployment relief and that it
would be unjust for ratepayers to have also to provide them with
housing. The city’s 32,000 ratepayers, they proposed, produced over 80
per cent of municipal revenue, and their opinion and finances should
therefore be properly respected.136 G. B. McColl suggested that a
housing scheme providing accommodation for less than cost would be
suicidal. The only way to solve the housing problem, he claimed, was to
reduce taxation.137 A slum landlord, who preferred to remain anonymous,
declared that many slum residents were better off without water, toilets, or
baths. He said that he advocated a “root, hog, or die” policy to make slum-
dwellers responsible for their own well-being.138
From 1934 to 1937, on a nearly annual basis, the city had endeavoured
to acquire money from the federal government or to receive permission to
borrow money from private sources to develop a housing project. These
efforts failed because of a combination of opposition at both the federal
and local levels. Council was also unable to benefit from the Dominion
Housing Act because the Act did not allow for loans to be made directly
to municipalities. Yet overcrowding continued to worsen. R. A. Sara, an
alderman with a significant interest in the housing issue, declared,
“[T]he cancer of our slums gnaws at our vitals, largely unseen and unrea-
lized, but infinitely more dangerous, insidious, and fatal.”139 Given these
previous failures, the city searched for a new way to tackle the ever-
growing housing problem in its working-class neighbourhoods.
The answer the city developed was the City of Winnipeg Housing
Company (CWHC), formed in 1937 as a joint stock company that would
qualify for DHA loans. There was both local and federal impetus for
this new endeavour. W. C. Clarke, the federal Deputy Minister of
Finance, suggested the scheme to Winnipeg aldermen and, according to
David Mansur, was “particularly anxious to arrange some such scheme
135 Winnipeg Tribune, June 29, 1937.
136 Winnipeg Tribune, April 26, 1937.
137 Winnipeg Free Press, March 19, 1937.
138 Ibid.
139 COWA, Housing Folder 10, R. A. Sara, “Address Before the Technical Bureau, Winnipeg Board of
Trade,” April 8, 1937.
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. . . rather than face the necessity of bringing in further legislation to
provide for real low-cost housing and slum clearance.”140 To run the
company, preferred stock was to be sold to “public spirited citizens and
companies,” while the common stock would be given to the City of
Winnipeg in exchange for property.141 Preferred shareholders were prom-
ised an annual dividend of 5 per cent once the company was profitable,
with all further profits going to the city.142
The CWHC said that its purposes were to provide a competent insti-
tution to which DHA mortgages could be made, independent business
management in the selection of sites and giving of construction contracts,
work for artisans and building mechanics, and moderately priced homes to
the many Winnipeggers who needed them, as well as to transform vacant
lots into taxpaying properties.143 The company itself would not build houses
but, rather, would act as a service company to help prospective owners
select a lot and building plan and secure a DHA loan.144 Home buyers had
to put down a minimum payment of $400, and up to 80 per cent of the
value of the home could be lent by Sun Life Assurance and the CWHC.145
The company was to be governed by a five-member board including the
city treasurer, one other city representative, and three preferred share-
holders.146 In addition to giving property to the CWHC, the city provided
other assistance as well. Records show that the CWHC frequently borrowed
municipal engineers and architects to assist in the technical aspects of housing
development.147
CWHC shareholders included many of Winnipeg’s largest corporations
and wealthiest individuals. The largest shareholder was the Timothy Eaton
Company, which purchased 50 shares. The Winnipeg Electric Company,
James Richardson, and several large building companies and law firms
140 Winnipeg Free Press, April 29, 1937, quoted in Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, p. 108. Mansur
was the chief mortgage inspector for Sun Life.
141 COWA, Housing Folder 1, “Resolution Passed by Directors of the City of Winnipeg Housing
Company Limited,” April 8, 1938, p. 2. Private citizens were seen by some, such as W. H. Carter
of the National Employment Council, as a better judge of appropriate housing schemes than the
government. “Public-spirited” citizens, he suggested, would do what was best for the community
and would avoid political interests and influences (Winnipeg Free Press, March 18, 1937).
142 COWA, Housing Folder 1, “Resolution Passed by Directors of the City of Winnipeg Housing
Company Limited,” April 8, 1938.
143 COWA Housing Folder 1, “Resolution Passed by Directors of the City of Winnipeg Housing
Company Limited,” April 8, 1938. It was estimated that the city would obtain $100 per year in
taxes from each house that was constructed. See Financial Post, October 9, 1937.
144 COWA, Housing Folder 18, “City of Winnipeg Housing Company Ltd. President’s Report.”
145 Financial Post, October 9, 1937.
146 COWA, Housing Folder 1,“Suggested DHA Program for Winnipeg,” p. 2.
147 COWA, File 7119, letter from Frank Halls, President of the CWHC to the Committee on Public
Safety, February 17, 1938. It should be noted that, while city employees worked for the CWHC,
their pay was still provided by the city.
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also held shares.148 Those who had purchased preferred shares were
described as “having only one object in view, unselfishly to improve unem-
ployment conditions in Winnipeg by providing work, and to improve the
financial position of the city by increasing the real estate tax income of
the city.”149 Undoubtedly, some shareholders may have had philanthropic
motivations, but it is hard to imagine that they were all entirely altruistic.
The presence of numerous building companies on the list of preferred
shareholders suggests that these companies were hoping to benefit from
the building the CWHC was expected to encourage. Additionally, being
a shareholder of this company meant having a tremendous influence
over the course of housing reform in the city.
To demonstrate its ability to remedy the city’s housing crisis, the CWHC
immediately began constructing a model home. A public contest was held
to see who could design a house that would cost less than $3,200 to con-
struct, would comply with the DHA, would follow the city’s fair wage
schedule, and could be reproduced. The winning bid came from Henry
Borger and Son, who offered to build the house for 24.5 cents per
square foot.150 The city provided a lot on Ashburn Street, and construction
was completed in the fall of 1937 (see Figure 3).
The model home had three bedrooms, a bathroom, living room, kitchen, and
a semi-circular vestibule at the front. A brochure written about the house
bragged of its “convenience,” “efficiency,” and “economical planning.”151 It
stated that the “modern plumbing and a step-saving kitchen, complete a
design for comfortable living that will make an instant appeal to every home
lover. The whole home provides for an easy flow of human life, maximum
comfort and minimum labour, making for true dignity in family life.”152 The
local press raved about the home’s modern features. The Tribune pointed
out that the kitchen was designed by experts so that “there will be no more
complaints about having the sink and table too high or too low, or having to
do the cooking with your back to the light.”153 Lest the children be forgotten,
there was a clean, safe playroom in the basement.154 This was, it seemed, the
perfect home for the modern family (see Figure 4).
The model home was a popular attraction. During the first two weeks
that it was open, an estimated 12,000 people visited the site. Dignitaries
such as Norman Rogers, the federal Minister of Labour, toured the
148 COWA, Housing Folder 6, “The City of Winnipeg Housing Company Limited Preferred Stock,”
November 4, 1937.
149 COWA, Housing Folder 1, “Resolution Passed by the Directors of the City of Winnipeg Housing
Company Ltd.”
150 Winnipeg Free Press, July 7 and August 18, 1937.
151 COWA, Housing Folder 3, “A Home You May Own and Pay for Monthly.”
152 Ibid., p. 7.
153 Winnipeg Tribune, September 23, 1937.
154 COWA, Housing Folder 3, “A Home You May Own and Pay for Monthly,” p. 13.
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home, describing it as one of the best demonstration houses he had seen
anywhere in Canada.155 Yet, despite the large crowds and warm reviews,
the house drew significant criticism from a diverse assortment of
opponents. On council, the main opponent of the house was Charles
Simonite, who questioned whether it could be reproduced at the budgeted
price of $3,200 because numerous items for the model home had been
donated.156 He maintained that there was no need in the city for additional
housing and that the struggle to sell the model home demonstrated this.157
Others argued that the house itself was flawed. In a letter to
Alderman R. A. Sara, the driving force on council behind the
CWHC, James Scott pointed out that the model home was far from
the streetcar line and had poor bus connections to downtown.158 The
Figure 3: Winnipeg’s model home. (Source: City of Winnipeg Archives).
155 Winnipeg Free Press, October 16, 1937; COWA, Housing Folder 10, “Memorandum for Mayor
Warriner Re: Winnipeg Housing Plan,” November 15, 1937.
156 Winnipeg Tribune, November 13, 1937; Winnipeg Free Press, July 30 and August 18, 1937; Winnipeg
Tribune, August 10, 1937. The Building Trades Council also questioned the ability of contractors to
build a $3,200 house and still pay fair wages. See Winnipeg Free Press, July 31, 1937.
157 Winnipeg Free Press, December 11, 1937.
158 COWA, Housing Folder 3, letter from James Scott to R. A. Sara, November 6, 1939.
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difficult commute made Ashburn Street an inconvenient location for
most workers. Many labour aldermen questioned why the model
home had been built so far from the city centre that a low-wage
earner could not possibly afford to live there because of the cost of
Figure 4: The scientifically designed kitchen of Winnipeg’s model home. (Source: City of
Winnipeg Archives).
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transportation.159 The Building Trades Council commented that its
members were “thunderstruck at the inconsistency in proposing to
build a low-cost house in a locality where a low-wage earner would
find it hard to meet taxation payments.”160 The cost of the home,
$30.65 per month for 20 years if $400 was put down as a deposit (the
monthly payment could be as low as $26.71 with a deposit of $1,000)
far exceeded what the average working-class family could afford to
pay.161 The CWHC had built a wonderful home for the middle class,
but middle-class housing had never been the problem. As even the
Financial Post would note, the model home, for all its modern conven-
iences, failed to address the city’s greatest housing need: low-cost
housing.162
If $30 per month was too much, what then could a working-class family
afford to pay for lodging? In 1938, John Queen suggested that, since the
average Manitoban earned an income of $929 per year and could spend
20 per cent of that on housing, a family could only afford to pay $16 per
month.163 Meanwhile, Winnipeg’s monthly rent allowance for a family of
five on relief was $12 per month in September 1936.164 Humphrey
Carver pointed out that 36 per cent of all Canadian households made
less than $80 per month and so could not even afford to pay $16 (assuming
that they used 20 per cent of their income for housing).165 Clearly, if the
average worker could afford $16 per month (perhaps far less), a plan
that required the expenditure of $30 per month for 20 years, in addition
to a deposit of $400, was far out of the reach of Winnipeg’s workers.
After some embarrassing delays, the CWHC finally sold the model
home in January 1938 to Gilbert Crook, the chief engineer of
St. Joseph’s Orphanage.166 The model home proved to be the last dwelling
ever built by the CWHC. The provincial legislature refused to amend the
city charter to allow the City of Winnipeg to sell land to the company in
exchange for shares, thus making it impossible for the CWHC to carry
159 Winnipeg Free Press, December 27, 1937. Not only was the house in a bad location in the city, but it
was also built in an odd location on its lot. The veranda of the model home stuck out ten feet farther
than the adjacent houses, giving it a rather peculiar appearance.
160 Winnipeg Free Press, July 31, 1937. The BTC even suggested that the arrangement of the stairway in
the model home was unsuitable for a working man’s house.
161 COWA, Housing Folder 3, “A Home You May Own and Pay for Monthly,” p. 15.
162 Financial Post, October 9, 1937.
163 COWA, Housing Folder 14A, “Minutes of a Meeting of the National Executive, Central
Management Committee, and Regional Chairmen of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and
Municipalities,” May 31, 1938 – June 1, 1938, p. 4.
164 Struthers, No Fault of their Own, p. 221.
165 Humphrey Carver, “The National Housing Conference, 1939,” Journal of the Royal Architectural
Institute of Canada, April 1939, p. 71.
166 COWA, File 7119, letter from Gilbert Crook to R. A. Sara, December 16, 1937; Winnipeg Free
Press, January 8, 1938.
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out its mandate.167 Although there is not much evidence that might explain
why the request was turned down by the province, newspaper reports
suggest that one MLA argued that giving land to the CWHC meant pre-
ferential treatment for one firm over all others.168 The company continued
to exist on paper into the 1940s, eventually deriving some income from war
bonds, but essentially was dead by 1938. Winnipeg’s attempt to engage
with the DHA had failed, both because of the limitations of the federal
legislation and because the solution developed by local leaders failed to
address the needs the city faced.
The End of the Decade (1938–1939)
Winnipeg’s city council did move to take advantage of some provisions of
the NHA. In late 1938, the city agreed to sell numerous lots for $50 to
make them eligible for NHA funding. This allowed the federal government
to assist property owners with the municipal taxes on these properties for
three years. In February 1939, however, the Winnipeg Free Press pointed
out that, although 90 homes had been built on city-owned lots since
August 1938 (when the provision was put in place), none had been on
$50 lots. The average city lot sold was priced at $350. Most of the $50 lots
were in inconvenient locations where people did not want to build.169 As a
result, the tax payment provision had very little practical effect in Winnipeg.
Overcrowding remained a problem in Winnipeg in the late 1930s. In 1937, 93
dwellings were built, but 227 had been destroyed or converted for other pur-
poses. In 1938 it was reported that, over the previous five years, 601 new dwell-
ing units had been constructed but there had been 12,946 marriages.170 The city
was losing, rather than gaining, housing stock. The city particularly needed
small dwelling units of five rooms or fewer, because this was what people
with low incomes could afford. In 1938, however, there were only 24 such
units vacant in the city that were habitable without repair.171 The vacancies
that did exist were located far from the city centre. A year earlier there had
not been a single vacancy in the downtown core.172 City council estimated
167 COWA, Housing Folder 1, “Resolution Passed by the Directors of the City of Winnipeg Housing
Company Limited,” April 8, 1938.
168 Winnipeg Tribune, April 12, 1938. Hansard records were not kept by the province at the time, so the
transcript of the debate is unavailable.
169 Winnipeg Free Press, February 11, 1939.
170 COWA, Housing Folder 25, Alexander Officer, “Report of the Twentieth Annual Survey of Vacant
Houses and Vacant Suites in the City Also Total Housing Accommodation and Remarks on
Housing in General,” January 1938.
171 Ibid. A further 42 dwellings were available with slight repair.
172 The region described stretched from Broadway Avenue to Notre Dame Avenue and from Colony
Street to the Red River. COWA, Public Health and Welfare File 1084, letter from Mr. Argue to the
Unemployment Relief Committee, Subcommittee on Housing, June 28, 1937.
Class, Capitalism, and Construction 423
that, if every family was to have a separate dwelling, Winnipeg was short by
6,606 dwelling units, a shortage of 12 per cent of the total housing stock.173
Instead of requesting money under the NHA, city council decided that it
would put forward a plan for a $1.5 million housing project as an unem-
ployment relief measure. Unlike in other years, when the city had put
numerous relief measures forward for consideration, the housing project
was the only one it submitted to the federal government in 1938.174 It jus-
tified this decision by saying that 36 per cent of the people on relief in
Winnipeg were trade artisans and thus would be directly affected by the
construction activity that such a project would provide. The employment
of 2,000 relief recipients building houses, the city proposed, would save
between $80,000 and $100,000 per month in relief costs. Building houses
as a relief measure was seen as an effective way of both dealing with the
poor quality housing that many Winnipeg residents inhabited and provid-
ing work for thousands of otherwise unemployed craftsmen.175 In addition
to providing employment, a housing scheme, unlike other relief projects
that had been undertaken in the city (sewage systems, roads, public build-
ings, or bridges), would be self-liquidating. To city council, such a proposal
made significant financial sense.176
The city proposed that it would supply the land and would request a
$500,000 contribution from the federal government with an additional
loan of $1 million at 3 per cent interest, to be repaid over 40 years. With
this money, the city planned to provide housing at low rents for 500
families.177 The 1938 plan was very similar to the one put forward in
1934 and was designed by the same architectural firm. While on a slightly
smaller site than in 1934, 13 acres as opposed to nearly 17, the site was still
to be ringed by three-storey apartment buildings with row houses on the
inside. Parks were a central feature of the site, and there was to be no
traffic inside the development. Units were projected to rent for as low as
$19.25 per month for a one-bedroom suite. Only families earning less
than $100 per month and not already living in decent accommodation
were to qualify to live in these municipal dwellings.178
As they had done in previous reform efforts, numerous aldermen and
community figures opposed the plan. Residents near the site argued that
such a development would reduce their property values.179 Alderman
F. G. Thompson, who thought that supporters of a municipal housing
plan must be either “communists or fascists,” criticized the rental
173 COWA, “The Need for Housing,” City Council Minutes, May 16, 1938, p. 387.
174 Winnipeg Tribune, May 18, 1938.
175 COWA, “The Need for Housing,” City Council Minutes, May 16, 1938, pp. 390–391.
176 Ibid., p. 391.
177 Winnipeg Free Press, May 18, 1938.
178 Winnipeg Free Press, September 23 and November 3, 1938.
179 Winnipeg Free Press, February 13, 1939.
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housing scheme, reiterating a familiar argument that the type of people
who would rent the homes were not the type who would take proper care
of them.180 A letter to the Free Press that was forwarded to Prime Minister
Mackenzie King also demonstrates some of the philosophical opposition
to housing plans. J. G. Harvey wrote that “the whole idea is only another
means of destroying the self-dependence, self-responsibility, and self-
reliance of our people.” In addition to supposedly endangering the indepen-
dent spirit of Winnipeggers, Harvey also suggested that “not everyone in the
West thinks that the people of the rest of Canada ought to take over the
burden of unwisely incurred debts or erect dwelling houses in the City of
Winnipeg for poor people.”181 Harvey need not have feared, as the federal
government did not provide the funds necessary to complete the project.
The federal government decided to invest $100 million on road building
as unemployment relief works across the country. This may have been a sub-
stantial sum, but it had little effect on urban relief in Manitoba.182
As the decade drew to a close, municipal officials tried one last time to
prepare a scheme acceptable both to Winnipeggers and to the federal and
provincial governments. By this point a sense of desperation had set in,
evidenced by Alderman James Simpkin who exclaimed, “stop worrying
about the plans and try to get the money first!”183 A new proposal in
1939 suggested scattering buildings throughout the city rather than con-
centrating them in one district. These buildings would be four-room cot-
tages made up of two bedrooms, a kitchen/living room, and a bathroom
and would cost less than $3,000 to construct. They would not have
cellars, being built instead on concrete piers.184 The low cost of these
homes would make them accessible to many working-class Winnipeggers
and, it was hoped, would relieve the congestion in existing homes.
Several aldermen and community representatives encouraged council
not to send this plan to a referendum, fearing a result similar to that in
1935. Reverend J. W. Clarke, who had brought the issue of housing to
the fore in 1937, opposed submission of the housing plan to ratepayers
because he felt that tenants should also have a vote if the result was to
be truly representative.185 Similarly, James Cowan of the Greater
Winnipeg Youth Conference said that ratepayers formed a small minority
of the city mostly interested in obtaining rents by maintaining the status
quo, and thus any plan would be defeated in a referendum.186 The lobbying
180 Winnipeg Tribune, April 21, 1938; Winnipeg Free Press, May 18, 1938.
181 LAC, Mackenzie King papers, Reel C3734, 214131–2, letter from J. G. Harvey to the Right
Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, January 20, 1938.
182 LAC, Reel C3737, 219046–219055, “Report of the Joint Special Committee on Housing Conditions
and Special Committee on Unemployment Relief Works,” May 16, 1938.
183 Winnipeg Free Press, April 5, 1939.
184 Winnipeg Tribune, April 5, 1939; Winnipeg Free Press, March 8, 1939.
185 Winnipeg Free Press, April 4, 1939.
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of these groups was successful, and the city made an application to the pro-
vince to request the loan of $300,000 from the federal government under
Part II of the NHA, without the permission of ratepayers.187 This effort was
met with strenuous opposition from the Winnipeg Real Estate Board and
the Board of Trade and was eventually defeated by the provincial
legislature.188
Conclusion
After five years of intensive debate about Winnipeg’s housing crisis, a total
of one house (the model home) had been built with municipal support.
The city’s efforts demonstrated the limitations imposed by federal legis-
lation. Winnipeg’s city council tried several means of working with the
DHA and NHA programmes but was unsuccessful in doing so. Even the
Winnipeg Tribune, hardly a bastion of leftist thought, declared that
federal housing schemes had yet to touch “the fringe of the slum
problem, and [the] problem will not be touched until Ottawa shakes
itself out of its comfortable nineteenth-century belief that the average
Canadian can, if he tries, make himself a home.”189 Federal programmes,
or the lack thereof, were one significant reason behind the failure of
Winnipeg’s municipal government to invest in housing.
The federal government, however, should not bear all of the blame for
the failure of housing policy in Winnipeg. Although both the DHA and
NHA were flawed, opponents in Winnipeg did just as much, if not more,
damage to the cause of housing in the city. Whether led by Citizen alder-
men or the Home and Property Owners’ Association, many influential
Winnipeggers worked to stymie each successive housing proposal. Their
interest was in the profits they could make renting rooms to the working
class, and they did not want to compete with a government housing
agency in that field. These elites also had no interest in the potential of
increased taxation to pay for a municipal housing scheme. Even when a
plan went forward, such as the CWHC’s model home, it was of a type un-
likely to assist those living in slum conditions. Aggressive and repeated
interventions guaranteed that Winnipeg would not have effective
housing reform in the 1930s.
By 1941, housing in Western Canadian cities was generally more over-
crowded than in Eastern Canada and was more likely to lack sanitary
facilities such as toilets and bathtubs.190 Other Western cities had also
186 Winnipeg Free Press, March 22, 1939.
187 COWA, “City Council Minutes,” Motion 366, April 3, 1939, p. 231.
188 Winnipeg Free Press, March 8, 1939; COWA, Council Communications 17191, letter from the
Managing Secretary of the Board of Trade to Winnipeg City Council, March 6, 1939.
189 Winnipeg Tribune, March 22, 1939.
190 Michael Doucet and John Weaver, Housing the North American City (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991), p. 444. The overcrowding rate (more than one person
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failed to implement significant housing reforms or benefit from federal
programmes. Jill Wade’s study of housing in Vancouver demonstrates
that, although there were several groups (including labour, middle-class
reformers, church groups, and women’s organizations) lobbying for
housing reform, the city’s property owners and business elite rejected
such reforms. Consequently, Vancouver’s City Council did relatively little
about housing until 1937.191 Calgary considered developing housing to
sell to low-income residents as early as 1929, but this was rejected by an
incoming city council over cost concerns. In Edmonton, meanwhile, rate-
payers rejected a public housing scheme in 1938. A self-liquidating
house construction plan was developed in Edmonton in 1937, but by
1939 had only built 21 houses.192 Even this minimal effort made it one of
the most successful municipal housing programmes that decade in
Western Canada.
While the situation in other Western Canadian cities was comparable in
both the extent of the housing crisis and the inadequacy of federal or
municipal programmes to address it, Winnipeg’s strong labour and
reform movements were perhaps the most determined in their efforts to
address the city’s housing crisis, putting forward new plans on nearly an
annual basis. Yet, despite these efforts, property owners and wealthy tax-
payers defeated nearly every attempt to address the city’s housing short-
age. Additionally, in the absence of support from higher levels of
government, Winnipeg, already stretched to its financial limit by the
Great Depression, was unable to address housing on its own. As a
result, the housing crisis in Winnipeg worsened throughout the 1930s
despite the efforts of the city’s housing reformers.
per room) was 24 per cent in Regina, 22.2 per cent in Edmonton, 19.5 per cent in Saskatoon, and 19
per cent in Winnipeg. Meanwhile, in Ontario, Ottawa had an overcrowding rate of 17.4 per cent,
and the rate stood at 12.4 per cent in Toronto and 10.7 per cent in Hamilton. On the Prairies,
the rate of dwellings without or only shared use of a flush toilet ranged from 14.5 per cent in
Winnipeg to 36.3 per cent in Saskatoon. Conversely, the range in Ontario was from 6.8 per cent
in Windsor to 16.8 per cent in Toronto.
191 Wade, Housing for All, p. 86.
192 Wetherell and Kmet, Homes in Alberta, pp. 186, 188.
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